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I. INTRODUCTION
"[T]rial by jury is more than an instrument of justice and more
than one wheel of the constitution: it is the lamp that shows that
freedom lives."'
Jury trials are deeply rooted in American history and have been doc-
umented from the Magna Carta to the United States Constitution.2
The Sixth Amendment guarantees every adult in criminal court the
right to a jury trial.3 However, in many states, 4 children who commit
crimes are tried in a separate court system where they are denied the
fundamental right to ajury trial.5
This Comment examines the basis and justifications for affording
jury trials within the juvenile court system. Part II compares the pur-
poses, policies, and protections of the criminal court system with those
of the juvenile court system. Part III traces the historical development
ofjuvenile courts. Part IV addresses the development of the law on the
right to ajury trial, focusing on the constitutional bases of the right in
adult court and the evolution of constitutional rights in juvenile court.
Part V examines the reasons why some states grant the right to a jury
trial and why other states deny the right. Finally, Part VI concludes
that Minnesota 6 should grant the right to a jury trial in juvenile court.
1. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 n.23 (1968) (quoting SIR PATRICK DEV-
LIN, TRIAL BYJURY 164, xxx (1956)).
2. Id. at 151; see also Ronald K. Carpenter, A Due Process Dilemma-Juries for
Juveniles, 45 N.D. L. REv. 251, 256-57 (1969).
3. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part that: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed...." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
4. See discussion infra part V.B.
5. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 549 (1971) (denying the right to a
jury trial in juvenile court proceedings). But see DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 34
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that a juvenile is entitled to a jury trial at the
adjudicative stage).
6. In 1992, the Minnesota Legislature convened an Advisory Task Force to study
the juvenile justice system. See MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ADvIsORY TASK FORCE ON
[Vol. 20
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II. PURPOSES AND PROTECTIONS OF THE CRIMINAL SYSTEM
The criminal court system provides a baseline against which the juve-
nile court system may be compared. The following overview traces the
evolution of the purposes, policies, and protections of the criminal sys-
tem and reveals the similarities between adult and juvenile courts.
The goal of the criminal justice system changes with each era's phi-
losophies and beliefs.7 Over time, the pendulum has swung from retri-
bution, the system's original purpose, to the opposite extreme of
rehabilitation, and then back again. 8
A. Retribution
A retributive criminal system existed for hundreds of years in Eng-
lish common law and subsequently was adopted by early American
courts.9 Retribution is the intentional infliction of pain and suffering,
to the extent deserved, on criminals that willingly committed a
crime.10 Criminal sentencing guidelines reflect a particular society's
view of criminal offenders and reveal whether the society desires to
punish the offenders with harsh sentences or to provide rehabilitative
measures through less severe punishment."l One of the earliest re-
corded retributive sentencing guidelines states: "Whoever kills... shall
surely be put to death.... If a [person] causes disfigurement of [one's]
neighbor, as [the person] has done, so shall it be done to [that per-
son]-fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. "12
B. Rehabilitation
Between 1865 and 1880, penology experts theorized that criminals
should be incarcerated not only for punishment, but also for rehabili-
tation.13 Where retribution looks backward and focuses on punish-
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT, reprinted in 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 595,
- (1994) [hereinafter MINN. TASK FORCE REPORT]. One of the issues the Task Force
examined was whether the right to ajury trial extends to serious juvenile offenders. Id.
at 646-49. See also infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
A Minority Report on the Right to Jury Trial was submitted by Task Force member
Barry Feld, Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. MINN. TASK FORCE
REPORT, at 684-91. The Minority Report recommended thatjury trials be afforded in all
juvenile court proceedings. Id. at 691.
7. Barbara A. Fisfis, Criminal Law-United States Sentencing Guidelines-Career Of
fender Status-Defining a "Crime of Violence, "30 DuQ. L. REv. 1053, 1061 (1992).
8. Id. at 1061-65.
9. Id. at 1063.
10. Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of Punish-
mentJustified, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1149, 1150 (1990).
11. Fisfis, supra note 7, at 1061-62.
12. Leviticus 24:17-20 (New King James).
13. Fisfis, supra note 7, at 1064. Rehabilitative treatment was achieved through the
medical model, which advocated that criminal conduct was the result of emotional and
1994]
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ment for past crimes, rehabilitation looks forward 14 and strives to
convert criminals into law-abiding citizens by providing them with skills
and values.' 5 Instead of the retributive motto, "an eye for an eye," the
watch-cry of rehabilitation advocates was "an eye patch for an eye."16
Sentencing guidelines were relaxed to accomodate the new rehabili-
tative policies, allowing judges to design individualized treatment for
criminal offenders. 17 Under this type of flexible sentencing, judges
were encouraged to use their discretion when imposing sentences in
order to maximize the possibility of rehabilitating the criminal offend-
ers.18 Through indeterminate sentencing, judges hoped to break the
cycle of crime by giving offenders "whatever skills or opportunities
were necessary to prevent them from committing future crimes."' 9
C. The Swing Back Toward Retribution
Despite the optimism and good intentions with which indeterminate
sentencing was introduced, studies conducted in the late 1960s and
1970s demonstrated no reduction in criminal recidivism rates.20 Many
criminals merely pretended to be rehabilitated so that they could be
released on probation, only to later return to prison.2 1 Legal reform-
ers, concluding that rehabilitating criminals did not work, 22 began to
call for a return to retributive justice.2 3 Abandonment of the rehabili-
tative model eroded the justification for flexible sentencing.
2 4
psychological disabilities that could be diagnosed and treated. GEORGE E. Dix & M.
MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAw 81 (3d ed. 1987).
14. Blecker, supra note 10, at 1150.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1197.
17. By 1911, the federal system and 21 states had adopted indeterminate sentenc-
ing. Fisfis, supra note 7, at 10.
18. Id. at 1065; see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). Writing for the
Court, Justice Black acknowledged the trend away from retribution to rehabilitation:
"Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and
rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence." Id.
at 248.
19. Michele H. Kalstein et al., Calculating Injustice: The Fixation on Punishment as
Crime Contro4 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 575, 591 (1992).
20. Id. at 592.
21. Blecker, supra note 10, at 1203.
22. Id.
23. Fisfis, supra note 7, at 1067 (citing Ernest A. Schoellkopff, Ordering the Purposes
of Sentencing: A Prologue to Guidelines, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y, 503, 512
(1985-87)). The lack of success with the rehabilitative model left criminal justice ad-
ministrators with two options. The first option was to remain committed to rehabilita-
tion "but [to] focus on the needs of the offender rather than the goal of crime control."
Kalstein et al., supra note 19, at 593. The second option was to abandon rehabilitation
in favor of deterrence and incapacitation. Id. Administrators chose the second option.
Id.
24. Kalstein et al., supra note 19, at 593.
[Vol. 20
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The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was a direct result of the move-
ment back toward retribution. 25 Designed specifically to address the
problems of indeterminate sentencing, the Act targeted disparate sen-
tencing, discrimination, and excessive leniency.26 The legislature's
return to retribution also heralded guarantees of procedural protec-
tion in the court system. Between 1963 and 1975, the right to coun-
sel,27 the privilege against self-incrimination during custodial
interrogation, 28 the right to a jury trial,29 the right to confront wit-
nesses,3 0 and a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt31 were
constitutionalized.
Since 1963, the United States Supreme Court has protected the ac-
cused with procedural safeguards. "[O]ur state and national constitu-
tions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which every defendant stands equal before the law."32 Today, criminal
courts also provide full procedural constitutional protection because
of the emphasis on retribution as the basis for punishment.
3 3
III. HisTORicMAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM
Established as a separate system 100 years ago, juvenile courts have
evolved from an exclusively rehabilitative system to a system that incor-
porates both rehabilitation and retribution. The development of the
juvenile court system can be traced from the treatment of young of-
fenders in the early criminal court system, to the creation of a separate
court system exclusively for juvenile offenders, to the current trends in
juvenile courts.
A. Early Treatment of Juveniles in the Court System
Prior to 1899, the American court system closely resembled the Eng-
lish court system. Although children under age seven were not prose-
cuted because they were considered incapable of forming criminal
25. Fisfis, supra note 7, at 1068. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 is codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-86, 3621-25, 3742 (1988) and at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988).
26. Fisfis, supra note 7, at 1068. "[T]he philosophical pendulum has swung away
from the emphasis on rehabilitation, which is no longer an enunciated goal of Federal
determinate sentencing." People v. Marchese, 608 N.Y.S.2d 776, 782 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1994).
27. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
28. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 436 (1966).
29. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1968).
30. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970).
31. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975).
32. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
33. See generally Martin L. Forst & Martha Edin Bloomquist, Punishment, Accountabil-
ity and the New Juvenile Justice, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT.J. 1, 2 (1992).
1994]
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intent,34 children over the age of seven were subjected to the same
process and punishment as adult offenders.35 Children and adults
were tried side by side. Juvenile offenders were given long prison
sentences, incarcerated with hardened criminals, and even executed.36
Although juvenile offenders were entitled to the same constitutional
safeguards as adult offenders, such as the right to due process, they
were subjected to the harshness of the adult criminal system.3 7
B. Creation of the First Juvenile Courts
1. National System
Juvenile justice reformers3 8 were appalled that juvenile offenders
were tried alongside adult offenders in criminal courts that were
34. In reGault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967). Based on a system of fairness, children under
seven were not prosecuted, while children over that age were prosecuted as criminals.
Id. The rationale was that a child under the age of seven should "go free ofjudgment
because [the child] knoweth not of good and evil." JackJ. Rappeport, Determination of
Delinquency in the Juvenile Court: A Suggested Approach, 1958 WASH. U. L.Q. 123, 132 n.25
(1958) (citing Eyre of Kent, 24 SELD. SOC. 109 (1909)). In Illinois, before the creation
of the juvenile courts, children over the age of 10 were prosecuted as adults. See People
ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 286 (1870).
However, many states, in the process of developing juvenile courts, raised the age
of criminal capacity when they enacted their Juvenile Court Acts. For example, in Min-
nesota, a child under the age of 14 is considered incapable of committing a crime.
MINN. STAT. § 609.055, subd. 1 (1992). Under certain circumstances, juvenile offenders
between the ages of 14 and 18 may be prosecuted as adults. Id., subd. 2.
35. Gault, 387 U.S. at 16.
36. THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 87 (1992) (citing Julia
Lathrop, Introduction to SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE & EDITH ABBOTT, THE DELIN-
QUENT CHILD AND THE HOME, 2-4 (1970)). Julia Lathrop, who later served as Chief of
the Federal Children's Bureau, reported that in the six months prior to the establish-
ment of the first juvenile court in Chicago, 332 boys between the ages of nine and 16
were sent to the city prison where they were kept in "lock-ups" in the company of adult
prisoners. Id. See also Turner, 55 Ill. at 286.
37. Ex parte Becknell, 51 P. 692, 693 (Cal. 1897). Becknell committed burglary at
the age of 13, and the lower court committed him to Whittier State School until he
reached the age of majority. Id. The California Supreme Court declared that a person,
even a juvenile, cannot be imprisoned as a criminal without a jury trial. Id.; see also
Turner, 55 Ill. at 286 (applying due process of law to a young criminal offender); Com-
monwealth v. Horregan, 127 Mass. 450 (1897) (guaranteeing the right to presentment
by a grand jury); Timothy E. Foley, Juveniles and Their Right to a Jury Tria4 15 VILL. L.
REv. 972, 973 n.9 (1970).
38. The reformers consisted mainly of conservative wives and daughters of power-
ful Chicago businessmen who believed that the wealthy had an obligation to return
something to the less fortunate through public service. BERNARD, supra note 36, at 85-
86. These women entered the slums of Chicago to care for and work with the children.
The women eventually fought on behalf of the children before the city council and
state legislature arguing for major policy changes in the handling ofjuvenile offenders.
Id.
[Vol. 20
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designed to implement punitive rather than rehabilitative theories.3 9
The reformers believed that childrens' behavior was merely reflections
of the environment, and that treatment, not punishment, was the ap-
propriate solution.40 They wished to remove the juvenile offenders
from a system of punishment to an atmosphere that was conducive to
rehabilitation. 4 1 The reformers presumed that these juveniles, once
removed from the culpable environment,42 could be treated and re-
turned to society. 43 Reformers believed that this kind of nurturing
could overcome most of nature's defects as well as the environment's
negative influences.
44
In 1899, consistent with the reform movement, Illinois abandoned
the notions of crime and punishment for young offenders45 and cre-
ated the first juvenile court system. 46 Underlying this newly-created
system was the premise that the state had a duty, as parens patriae,
47 to
39. In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Foley, supra note 37, at
973; see also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
40. TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 2 (1967) [herein-
after YOUTH CRIME]. Reformers blamed the environment for the rise in truancy and
delinquency during the growth of industrialization and immigration in the late 1800s,
which resulted in the overcrowding of cities, disruption of family life, and increased
crime. Id.; see also ANTHONY M. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS 4 (1977).
41. YOUTH CRIME, supra note 40, at 3.
42. Reformers maintained that it was important to remove the children from the
influences of the "manifold temptations of the streets" as well as from their "weak and
criminal parents." BERNARD, supra note 36, at 87. Another common view was that the
childrens' delinquent behaviors were evidence of the corruptness of the parents. Rap-
peport, supra note 34, at 131.
43. Foley, supra note 37, at 973; see also PLATr, supra note 40, at 47. Many reformers
assumed that, with rehabilitation, the "abnormal" and "troublesome" youth could be
trained to become useful and productive citizens. Id. By removing the juvenile offend-
ers from society, diagnosing and treating their problems, and then placing the juvenile
offenders back into society, reformers believed they could offset the hazardous environ-
ments. YOUTH CRIME, supra note 40, at 2.
44. PLATr, supra note 40, at 51.
45. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
46. 1899 Il. Laws 131; Gault, 387 U.S. at 14; Note, A RecommendationforJuvenileJuty
Trials in Minnesota, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 587, 588 (1984) [hereinafter JuvenileJury
Trials].
Commentators disagree whether Illinois was the first state to create a special system
for juvenile offenders. PLATr, supra note 40, at 9-10. Massachusetts, in 1874, and New
York, in 1892, passed laws that provided separate trials for children and adults. Id. at 9.
Regardless of which state was first to implement a juvenile court, authorities generally
agree that Illinois passed the first juvenile court act. Id. at 9-10. The Illinois Act was so
revolutionary in the area ofjuvenile justice that it was the first official enactment to be
acknowledged as a model statute, both nationally and internationally. Id.
47. Parens patriae literally means "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1114 (6th ed. 1990). The term connotes the idea that the state is the ultimate parent of
all of its citizens. BERNARD, supra note 36, at 88. Parens patriae was a concept adopted by
English courts in cases where children lacked parental care because their parents had
died. Id. American courts adapted this concept to include children who lacked paren-
1994]
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intervene on behalf of juvenile offenders when parents did not effec-
tively perform their "parental" functions.48 The state, assuming the
role of surrogate parent, could provide what was necessary to help and
rehabilitate the children. 49 The court, acting on behalf of the state,
was charged with determining the best interests of juvenile offenders
and ensuring that those interests were served.50
Because juvenile offenders were to be rehabilitated rather than pun-
ished, reformers proposed an informal adjudicative environment that
involved only the judge and the offender.5 1 "The early concept[ ] ...
of the U]uvenile [clourt proceeding was one in which a fatherly judge
touched the heart and conscience of the erring youth by talking over
[his or her] problems, by paternal advice and admonition . 5. " 2 This
approach more closely resembled social work53 than the approach nor-
tal care because their parents were "weak" and "criminal." Id. at 87. See also supra note
42.
48. Gault, 387 U.S. at 17. Many states incorporated the "parental substitute" con-
cept within their juvenile court acts. For example, the original purpose of Minnesota's
Juvenile Court Act was "to secure for each minor under the jurisdiction of the court the
care and guidance, preferably in [the child's] own home." (emphasis added). Juvenile Jury
Trials, supra note 46, at 599 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 260.011, subd. 1 (1978) (repealed
1980)).
49. W. J. Keegan, Juiy Trials for Juveniles: Rhetoric and Reality, 8 PAC. LJ. 811, 811
(1977).
50. Gault, 387 U.S. at 15. Juvenile offenders were to be made to feel that they were
the object of the state's care and were being saved from criminal careers and moral
degradation. ORM W. KETCHAM, THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES, in THE CHANGING FACES OFJUVENILEJusTICE 14 (V. Lorne Stewart ed., 1978); see
also Foley, supra note 37, at 974.
51. Literature often references the notion that juvenile court judges represent a
fatherly image. Norman G. Kittel, JuvenileJustice Philosophy in Minnesota, 34Juv. & FAM.
CT. J. 93, 93 (1983). Juvenile court judges "often were portrayed to be kindly fathers
concerned for the welfare of their faltering delinquent children." Id. Ideally, judges
attempted to paternally guide the juvenile offenders into making wise choices. Juvenile
Jury Trials, supra note 46, at 602.
52. Gault, 387 U.S. at 25-26.
53. KETCHAM, supra note 50, at 11. In the juvenile court environment, juvenile
court judges did not need to determine guilt or innocence, as did the criminal courts.
Foley, supra note 37, at 974. Instead, judges adjudicated juvenile offenders as "delin-
quents." 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1974). The legislators hoped that ifjuvenile offenders were
adjudicated as "delinquents," rather than as "criminals," some of the stigma that accom-
panied criminal conviction would be reduced. Id. Moreover, if adjudicated as delin-
quents, juvenile offenders could be sent to reformatory or industrial schools, put on
probation, or released into parental custody, depending on the individual circum-
stances. Id.
In Minnesota, juvenile proceedings may result in counseling; probation; placement
of the juvenile in the custody of a child placing agency, welfare board, home school, or
the commissioner of corrections; as well as several other alternatives. MINN. STAT.
§ 260.185, subd. I(a)-(c) (1992).
[Vol. 20
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mally taken in the courtroom because each juvenile was studied and
treated as an individual.54
Other courts subsequently adopted the 1899 Illinois Juvenile Court
Act as a model. By 1932, there was a juvenile court system in every
state55 and over 600 independent juvenile courts throughout the
United States.56 The states clearly recognized the need for a juvenile
court system, and they responded with enthusiasm.
The first juvenile court system, with the Illinois model as its basis,
focused on caring for children.57 By its nonadversarial nature, the ju-
venile court system afforded judges flexibility to foster rehabilitation
rather than punishment.58 Petitions, hearings, dispositions, and adju-
dications replaced the complaints, warrants, convictions, and
sentences used in criminal court.59 The juvenile courts also applied
relaxed procedural policies which provided no right to confrontation,
no privilege against self-incrimination, and no right to representation
by counsel. 60 Failure to provide these rights was justified on the theory
that juvenile courts did not actually deprive juvenile offenders of lib-
erty, but rather took temporary custody of the children in their best
interests. 61
Some reformers questioned whether the procedural formalities of
the criminal courts, such as the right to ajury trial, ought to be incor-
porated into the new juvenile courts.62 The majority of reformers,
however, desired informality; thus, many of the procedural safeguards
that generally accompanied criminal court proceedings were omitted
54. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1974).
55. Foley, supra note 37, at 973.
56. PtATr, supra note 40, at 10.
57. KETCHAM, supra note 50, at 14. The Illinois juvenile court not only had jurisdic-
tion over any youth who committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would be
considered a crime, but also over any child who was destitute, homeless, abandoned, or
abused. BERNARD, supra note 36, at 89-90. The Juvenile Court Act was drafted so that, if
interpreted broadly, the Illinois juvenile court had jurisdiction over every poor child in
the city of Chicago. Id. at 90.
58. Foley, supra note 37, at 974.
59. Anna L. Simpson, Rehabilitation as the Justification of a Separate Juvenile Justice Sys-
tem, 64 CAL. L. REv. 984, 987 (1976).
60. Foley, supra note 37, at 974.
61. KETCHAM, supra note 50, at 14. Ketcham states that the founders of the juvenile
courts rejected the requirements of an adversarial atmosphere because the courts were
established to act in the best interests of the child. Id.; see also Foley, supra note 37, at
974.
62. Foley, supra note 37, at 974.
19941
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from juvenile court proceedings. 63 Accordingly, the philosophy of the
new juvenile justice system was "salvation," not "due process."64
2. Minnesota System
Prior to Minnesota's adoption of a juvenile court system, the state
practiced a parens patriae philosophy toward those children whom the
state placed in reform schools.65 The state interfered with the parent/
child relationship only "upon the destitution and necessity of the child
arising from want or default of parents."66
Creation of the Minnesota juvenile court system in 1917,67 further
advanced the state's primary objective to protect and care for the
child.68 The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the state's right to
"step in and save the child"69 as superior to the child's right to free-
dom.7 0 Thus, courts that placed children in reform schools justified
the placement by characterizing the state's right to intrude in the
child's life as a parental right, which included the power to restrain.
7 1
Consistent with that parental capacity, Minnesota echoed the reha-
bilitative philosophy that thejuvenile court was "designed to secure the
welfare of delinquent children, and not to punish them." 72 The courts
recognized that there were many "wayward, incorrigible, and ne-
glected children" who needed to be "humanely cared for, guided into
paths of rectitude and right living, and protected from contamination
by association with the lower elements of society." 73
63. Id. Although the early juvenile courts denied due process rights in the interest
of rehabilitation, Gault later granted juvenile offenders the due process rights of notice,
representation by counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, and confrontation. In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 41, 55, 57 (1967).
64. KETCHAM, supra note 50, at 14.
65. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 50 Minn. 353, 355, 52 N.W. 935, 936 (1892).
66. Id. (quoting Milwaukee Indus. Sch. v. Supervisors, 40 Wis. 328, 338 (1876)); see
also Peterson v. McAuliffe, 151 Minn. 467, 468, 187 N.W. 226, 227 (1922).
67. 1917 MINN. LAws 7162; see also Maynard E. Pirsig, Juvenile Delinquency and Crime:
Achievements of the 1959 Minnesota Legislature, 44 MINN. L. REv. 363, 363 (1960).
68. Peterson, 151 Minn. at 468, 187 N.W. at 227; see also State v. Zenzen, 178 Minn.
394, 394, 227 N.W. 356, 357 (1929) (declaring that the state intervenes primarily in the
interest of the child).
69. Peterson, 151 Minn. at 467, 187 N.W. at 226.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 469, 187 N.W.2d at 226.
Children are always under more or less restraint. In the parental home and in
the school they may not come and go as they please. And so when it is neces-
sary for the state to step in and perform the parental duty the liberty of the
child may be circumscribed.
Id.
72. Id. at 470, 187 N.W.2d at 227; see also Zenzen, 178 Minn. at 394, 227 N.W. at 356
(holding thatjuvenile delinquents are not entitled to an appeal because the Legislature
did not intend to treat juvenile delinquents as criminals).
73. Evans v. District Ct., 118 Minn. 170, 173, 136 N.W. 746, 747 (1912).
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The Minnesota Legislature codified its rehabilitative goals in the
1986 Juvenile Court Act. 74 Although it was enacted to promote the
public safety and reduce juvenile delinquency, the Act expressly di-
rected the juvenile courts to accomplish those goals using fair and just
means that recognized the "unique characteristics and needs of chil-
dren."7 5 The Act further stated that the means of rehabilitation
should "give children access to opportunities for personal and social
growth."7
6
C. Recent Trends in Juvenile Courts
After the juvenile system was created in the early 1900s, juvenile
courts were virtually ignored for nearly seventy years. In the last twenty
years, however, the realities of modern society have resulted in incre-
mental changes in juvenile courts. Because of these changes, the juve-
nile court system now more closely resembles the adult criminal court
system.
1. National Trends
In the 1930s and 1940s, the disposition ofjuvenile offenders was not
challenged because the model for the juvenile justice system was the
"social science model," a theory with which the legal profession was
unfamiliar. 7 7 The juvenile courts were responsible to care for and
serve the best interests of children; therefore, lawyers and judges, de-
ferring to the expertise of social workers, 78 did not intervene. More-
over, because juvenile offenders were not punished, but were saved
from criminal careers and moral degradation, "[t] he treated or saved
child had no need for protection from the court."
79
After World War II, however, critics of the juvenile justice system
began to challenge its effectiveness. The challenge arose because a
majority of the juvenile offenders were not "saved" but, instead, contin-
ued their antisocial behavior despite guidance from "fatherly
judges."8 0 Although the juvenile courts proclaimed salvation, scrutiny
of actual performance revealed that, in practice, the courts were pun-
ishing juvenile offenders rather than "treating" them. 8 '
74. MINN. STAT. § 260.011, subd. 2 (1986).
75. In re K.A.A., 410 N.W.2d 836, 838 (Minn. 1987) (quoting MINN. STAT.
§ 260.011, subd. 2 (1986)).
76. Id. at 841 n.10 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 260.011, subd. 2 (1986)).
77. KETCHAM, supra note 50, at 14. This model was premised on the theory that
"[t] here is no such thing as a bad [child]." Id. Social workers sought to bring misguided
youth back to the path of righteousness. These efforts were carried out by social work-
ers and were largely ignored by lawyers. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 15.
81. BERNARD, supra note 36, at 108.
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Recent statistics on juvenile crime highlight both the nature of the
cases that the juvenile courts adjudicate and the failure of those courts
to rehabilitate juvenile offenders. For example, although the overall
serious crime rate for the country has decreased slightly, the serious
crime rate for juveniles is on the rise.8 2 Juvenile arrests for violent
crimes increased forty-one percent between 1982 and 1991.83 During
that nine year period, juvenile murder arrests increased ninety-three
percent and aggravated assault arrests increased seventy-two percent.84
These statistics confirm that juvenile offenders commit a large
number of the crimes that occur in our society.8 5 The juvenile system
is, in effect, a system for offenders of serious crimes, not a system of
rehabilitation. Thejuvenile court system, therefore, mirrors the retrib-
utive basis of the adult criminal justice system.
Studies reveal that repeatjuvenile offenders with five or more police
contacts constitute less than twenty percent of the delinquents.8 6 How-
ever, those offenders are responsible for approximately two-thirds of
all offenses.87 This evidence shows that the juvenile court system fails
to rehabilitate a significant percentage of juvenile offenders and gives
rise to the inference that the system no longer achieves its primary
purpose of rehabilitation.
Today, juvenile offenders commit more serious crimes and juvenile
courts have adapted and responded accordingly. As a result, the reha-
bilitative ideals that initiated juvenile justice reform appear to have
been replaced, by necessity, with retributive policies and goals.
2. Minnesota Trends
The evolution of Minnesota's juvenile court system mirrors that of
the national system. 88 Minnesota's Juvenile Court Act, like those of
many states, was enacted early in the twentieth century.8 9 Following
enactment, Minnesota did little to change the juvenile court system
and, like the rest of the nation, 90 ignored the juvenile court system for
decades following its inception. In fact, the Act was not revised until
1959.91 That statutory revision changed many procedures, but the ini-
82. MINN. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 611-12.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. MINN. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 612.
88. Id. at 613.
89. 1917 MINN. LAws 7162; see also Pirsig, supra note 67, at 378.
90. See generally Kittel, supra note 51, at 94.
91. Act approved April 24, 1959, ch. 685, § 1, 1959 MINN. Laws 1275, 1275; Pirsig,
supra note 67, at 378.
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tial purpose of the Act was maintained: to ensure the welfare of the
child.92
Minnesota courts have historically adhered to a strict policy of reha-
bilitating juvenile offenders. For example, inJE.C. v. State,93 the Min-
nesota Supreme Court refused to refer a "hard-core sophisticated,
aggressive delinquent" to adult criminal court in the name of rehabili-
tation.94 A referee testified thatJ.E.C. needed security as well as reha-
bilitation, but, because there was no adequate juvenile facility, the
referee recommended that J.E.C. be tried in adult criminal court.9 5
The court rejected the referee's recommendation stating, "[t]he ab-
sence of rehabilitative facilities to treat appellant may not mean he is
not amenable to treatment as a juvenile if such facilities were avail-
able."96 J.E.C. demonstrates the extent of Minnesota's commitment to
the policy of rehabilitating juvenile offenders.
Despite Minnesota's continued concentration on rehabilitating juve-
nile offenders, the nature of cases before its juvenile courts is chang-
ing. Consistent with national statistics, Minnesota's statistics on
juvenile crime reveal the increasingly serious criminal nature of the
charges that the juvenile courts adjudicate and the failure of those
courts to rehabilitate juvenile offenders.
97
In Minnesota, juvenile arrests or apprehensions increased ten per-
cent from 1980 to 1991.98 Although this increase might seem slight, it
is startling to note that in 1991, nearly half of all arrests or apprehen-
sions for serious crimes involved juvenile offenders. 99 Juvenile offend-
ers accounted for forty-two percent of burglary arrests or
apprehensions, fifty-four percent of auto theft arrests or apprehen-
sions, and fifty-five percent of arson arrests or apprehensions. 100 Only
six percent ofjuvenile apprehensions involve serious or violent crimes;
thus, a small group of juvenile offenders commits a majority of the
serious or violent crimes.10 1
Despite the Minnesota juvenile court system's rehabilitative mission,
both fear and reality have forced changes that have made the juvenile
system similar to the adult criminal system. For example, the increase
in juvenile crime prompted the Minnesota Legislature to amend the
Purpose Clause of the Juvenile Court Act. The Act's original purpose
92. Pirsig, supra note 67, at 378.
93. 302 Minn. 387, 225 N.W.2d 245 (1975).
94. Id. at 389, 225 N.W.2d at 247.
95. Id. at 392, 225 N.W.2d at 249.
96. Id. at 393, 225 N.W.2d at 249.
97. MINN. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 613-14.
98. Id. at 613.
99. Id. at 613. Juvenile offenders accounted for 43% of arrests or apprehensions of
serious crimes. Id.
100. Id. at 614.
101. Id. at 613-14.
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was "to secure for each minor.., the care and guidance, preferabl[y]
in [the child's] own home."102 In 1988, the Legislature revised the pur-
pose clause "to promote the public safety and reduce juvenile delin-
quency."103 This significant change, from rehabilitation to retribution,
signaled a trend that the juvenile system was becoming more like the
adult criminal system. 104
The Minnesota Legislature acknowledged the need for more com-
prehensive reform and, in 1992, convened the Advisory Task Force on
the Juvenile Justice System to conduct a study of the juvenile court
system.105 The Task Force recognized that the current juvenile justice
system cannot adequately handle the unprecedented numbers of seri-
ous and repeat juvenile offenders. 10
6
After careful consideration, the Task Force issued recommendations
for changes in several areas of the juvenile justice system.' 0 7 Many of
those recommendations respond to the specific problems of serious
and repeat juvenile offenders in Minnesota. The Legislature subse-
quently enacted most of the changes recommended by the Task
Force.108
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW ON THE RIGHT TO JuRy TRIALs
Because rehabilitation has historically been the goal in juvenile
court proceedings, many procedural protections are not available to
juvenile offenders. Conversely, the adult criminal justice system, with
its focus on punishment, protects the rights of the accused through the
use of procedural safeguards' 09 such as the right to a jury trial.
Although the right to a jury trial is guaranteed in both criminal and
civil courts, there is no constitutional right to ajury trial in the juvenile
court system."10
102. MINN. STAT. § 260.011(2) (1978) (repealed 1980).
103. Id. § 260.011(2) (1988).
104. Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Court Liegslative Reform and the Serious Young Offender. Dis-
mantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal" 65 MINN. L. REV. 167, 192 (1980-1981) [hereinafter
Juvenile Court Legislative Reform].
105. See MINN. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 597-98.
106. Id. at 599.
107. The Task Force issued recommendations on the juvenile certification process,
the retention and use of juvenile delinquency records, statewide juvenile guidelines,
behavior modification and treatment approaches, the right to counsel, the right to a
jury trial, and the need for secure facilities. Id.
108. Act approved May 5, 1994, ch. 576, 1994 MINN. LAws 934.
109. Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Tria4 78J. CiuM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 134 (1987).
110. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971); DeBacker v. Brainard,
396 U.S. 28, 35 (1969).
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A. Constitutional Right to Jury Trials in Adult Court
1. Jury Trials in Criminal Cases
The right to a jury trial is not limited to federal courts. Every state
has passed legislation that guarantees the right to a jury trial in serious
criminal cases."' Although the right to ajury trial is "fundamental to
the American scheme of justice,"'12 the right was limited to serious
crimes' 1 3 until Duncan v. Louisiana.114
In 1968, Gary Duncan was charged with simple battery"t5 when he
attempted to avoid a potential conflict between two of his cousins and
four other boys."16 The court denied Duncan's request for ajury trial
because the Louisiana Constitution granted jury trials only in cases of
capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor.117 Duncan was
tried by ajudge and convicted.118
On review, the Supreme Court extended the Sixth Amendment
right to ajury trial to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.119 Although the Sixth Amendment right to jury
trials is guaranteed in all federal cases, it is not guaranteed in all state
cases.120 In order to apply to the states, the right to ajury trial must be
an element of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.121
The Duncan Court applied a "fundamental rights" test to decide if the
right to ajury trial is necessary for due process.122 The Court decided
that ajury trial is a fundamental right, "essential for preventing miscar-
riages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all
defendants."123 Subsequent to Duncan, the right to a jury trial was
guaranteed in all criminal cases, regardless of the severity of the
crime.124
111. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968).
112. Id. at 149.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Duncan was charged for allegedly slapping another boy on the elbow. Id. at
147.
116. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147.
117. Id. at 146 n.1.
118. Id. at 147.
119. Id. at 156.
120. Id. at 153-55.
121. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156. The Fourteenth Amendment declares that no state
can "deprive anyone of life, liberty or property without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
122. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148-49.
123. Id. at 158. The Supreme Court was concerned about protecting the accused
from "the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and ... the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge." Id. at 156.
124. In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968), the right to ajury trial was ex-
panded to include criminal contempt cases. Prior to Bloom, criminal contempt was not
considered a serious enough offense to warrant the constitutional protection of a jury
19941
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2. Jury Trials in Civil Cases
Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial
in criminal cases, the right was not automatically granted in other
cases. 125 The Seventh Amendment granted the right to a jury trial if
the case would have received ajury trial at common law. 126 Therefore,
if the English judicial system would have granted ajury trial, the right
would also be granted under the United States Constitution.1 27 The
English judicial system was divided into two separate courts: courts of
law heard legal claims;128 and courts of chancery heard equitable
claims.1 29 Although jury trials were widely available in the courts of
law, the judge presided without a jury in the chancery courts.' 3
0
Therefore, under the English judicial system, cases brought in a court
of law would receive the right to a jury trial but cases under the juris-
diction of the court of chancery received no right to a jury trial.131
The United States judicial system applied this method of distinguish-
ing between claims in law or equity to determine the right to jury trials
for more than one hundred and fifty years.13 2 However, in 1938, the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure resulted in a merger
of the courts of law and equity, allowing legal and equitable claims to
be joined.133 Although the new system simplified matters because all
claims were tried simultaneously, courts were given little guidance as to
the availability of juries for cases that contained both legal and equita-
ble claims.' 34 The Supreme Court was reluctant to disallow the right
trial. Id. at 197. The Bloom Court decided that criminal contempt cases create a com-
pelling argument for the provision of jury trials because contemptuous conduct "often
strikes at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament .... [I]t
frequently represents a rejection of judicial authority. . . ." Id. at 202. Extending
Duncan, the Bloom Court declared that if the right to ajury trial is fundamental in other
criminal cases, it must be extended to criminal contempt cases. Id. at 208.
125. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL ET AL., CMIL PROCEDURE 701 (3d ed. 1992).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 701.
128. Courts of law provided the legal remedy of money damages. Id. at 702.
129. Courts of chancery provided equitable remedies such as injunctions, specific
performance, or rescission. Id.
130. YEAZELL, supra note 125, at 701.
131. Id.
132. See Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928) (holding that
there can be "no substitution of equitable for legal remedies, whereby the constitu-
tional right of trial by jury is impaired").
133. YEAZELL, supra note 125, at 723; see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539
(1970) (stating that civil actions in federal court are no longer brought at law or in
equity, but are all joined under the Rules of Civil Procedure, under which all remedies
are available); Jerome A. Hoffman, Alabama's Right to Trial byjuiy in Civil Cases Since the
Merger of Law and Equity-What Has Changed and What Has Not, 32 A.A. L. REv. 465, 466-
67 (1981).
134. YEAZELL, supra note 125, at 723. The question of whether or not a person had a
right to ajury trial was more easily answered if the claim sought only one remedy. See,
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to a jury trial in a suit that involved both types of claims.135 In 1959,
the Court stated that, "[o] nly under the most imperative circumstances
...can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior
determination of equitable claims."136 The Court subsequently de-
cided that a jury trial could be denied only if the plaintiff proves the
issues are too complicated for ajury to unravel.137
Currently, both criminal and civil courts guarantee the right to a
jury trial. Although juvenile courts have adopted some forms of proce-
dural rights, the right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings has not yet
been constitutionally guaranteed.
B. Evolution of Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court
Juvenile courts have undergone a number of complex changes in
the ninety-five years since their creation, from providing no procedural
due process rights, to providing multiple rights as are granted in crimi-
nal courts. In the sixty-five years following the implementation of the
Illinois Juvenile Act,138 the Supreme Court did not hear a single case
regarding the juvenile court system.1 39 However, in 1966, the
Supreme Court heard the first of a series of cases regarding the due
process rights of young offenders in juvenile courts. Recognizing that
punishment for juvenile offenders was similar to that of adult offend-
ers in criminal courts, the Court instituted due process protections for
juvenile offenders.1 40 Although the Supreme Court acknowledged the
need for some procedural protections in juvenile court proceedings,
the Court stopped short of providing jury trials.
1. Right to a Hearing
In 1966, the Supreme Court, in Kent v. United States,141 considered
whether a hearing is required to waive jurisdiction in juvenile
courts.1 42 Morris A. Kent, Jr., age fourteen, was arrested, charged with
breaking into several houses, and placed on probation.143 Two years
later, while still on probation, Kent broke into a woman's apartment,
raped her, and stole her wallet.144 Kent moved for a hearing on waiver
e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters, & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 572 (1990)
(finding a legal remedy where a group of aggrieved truckers sought backpay).
135. Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959).
136. Id.
137. Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962).
138. 1899 Ill. Laws 131.
139. Keegan, supra note 49, at 812.
140. BERNARD, supra note 36, at 108.
141. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
142. Id. at 552-54.
143. Id. at 543.
144. Id.
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ofjurisdiction to criminal court.1 45 Kent also filed a motion to obtain
his own probation records for the previous two years to support his
argument against a waiver to criminal court.146 The judge received the
motions, did not rule on them, yet waived jurisdiction.147 As a result,
the case was heard by the district court and Kent was subsequently con-
victed and sentenced to thirty to ninety years in prison.148 Kent ap-
pealed, arguing that the waiver was defective without a hearing.149
The Supreme Court decided that the waiver violated the District of
Columbia's Juvenile Court Act which required a judge to hold a full
investigation prior to waiving jurisdiction.150 The Supreme Court rea-
soned that waiver of jurisdiction was a "critically important" action in
the juvenile justice system151 and, therefore, "must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment."152
Although the Court did not directly address the constitutional issue
of due process, its decision contained numerous references to the
need for necessary due process protections in juvenile court.'53 In
Kent, the Supreme Court laid the due process foundation for its deci-
sion in In re Gault.
2. Procedural Due Process Rights
One year later, the United States Supreme Court recognized four
due process rights for juvenile court proceedings in the controversial
case of In re Gault.154
145. Id. at 545. In the District of Columbia, juvenile offenders were subjected to the
jurisdiction of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court unless that court waived jurisdic-
tion. The offenders were then remitted for trial to the United States District Court to
be tried as adults. Id. at 547-48; see also BERNARD, supra note 36, at 110.
146. Kent, 383 U.S. at 546.
147. BERNARD, supra note 36, at 110.
148. Kent, 383 U.S. at 550. In the district court, Kent was convicted of six counts of
housebreaking and robbery and sentenced to serve five to 15 years on each count. Id.
at 549-50.
149. Id. at 552.
150. Id. at 553; see also BERNARD, supra note 36, at 110-11.
151. Kent, 383 U.S. at 553-54. Within the juvenile court, juvenile offenders receive
special rights and immunities that are not available in the criminal system. The right to
a hearing on a motion for waiver ofjurisdiction could mean the difference between five
years of confinement in the juvenile system and the possibility of the death penalty in
the criminal system. Id. at 557.
152. Id. at 562.
153. BERNARD, supra note 36, at 112. For example, the Court stated that the juvenile
offender is entitled to the statutory hearing "read in the context of constitutional prin-
ciples relating to due process and the assistance of counsel." Kent, 383 U.S. at 557.
154. 387 U.S. 1, 33, 41, 55, 57 (1967). Gault is considered controversial both for its
potentially broad and its potentially narrow interpretations. See generally Carpenter,
supra note 2, at 255. While the Court expanded the rights of juvenile offenders by
allowing the fights to notice, counsel, confrontation of witnesses, and the privilege
against self-incrimination, the Court declined to rule on two other due process claims,
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Gerald Gault, age fourteen, and his friend, Ronald Lewis, were ar-
rested for making lewd and indecent phone calls to their neighbor.
155
Gault was immediately taken to a detention home without notice to his
parents. 156 The petition that was filed did not state the charges against
Gault.' 5 7 After two hearings, during which no record was kept, Gault
was adjudicated a delinquent and committed to a detention center un-
til he reached the age of twenty-one.' 5 8
The Supreme Court recognized that neither the Fourteenth Amend-
ment nor the Bill of Rights apply to adults alone.159 The Court relied
on previous holdings in which juvenile offenders were given certain
due process protections.160 The Gault Court stated that although the
cases upon which it relied were restricted in their holdings, the cases
"unmistakably indicate" that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended
to apply to children as well as adults.'
6 1
After applying the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 162 the Supreme Court granted juvenile offenders four proce-
dural rights guaranteed in the criminal court system: adequate written
notice to the child and the child's parents of the specific issues; repre-
sentation by counsel; constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion; and confrontation of witnesses.163 The Court reiterated its
reasoning for upholding due process procedures and stated that no
result of consequence can be reached without the ceremony of court
proceedings.' 6 4 After In re Gault, the "ceremony" ofjuvenile court pro-
ceedings required due process procedural protections.
leaving the door open for decisions on other procedural rights. See In re Terry, 265
A.2d 350, 352 (Pa. 1970), in which Justice Roberts wrestled with Gault in determining
whether juvenile offenders should be granted jury trials.
155. Gault, 387 U.S. at 4. One of the questions the boys asked Mrs. Cook, the neigh-
bor, was, "Do you give any?" BERNARD, supra note 36, at 114.
156. Gault, 387 U.S. at 5.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 5-7. Mrs. Cook, Gault's neighbor, never appeared at the hearings to tes-
tify. Id. at 5; see also BERNARD, supra note 36, at 115.
159. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
160. Id. at 12 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)) (involving proceed-
ings in which ajuvenile offender would be waived to criminal court); id. at 12-13 (citing
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)) (stating that a coerced confession in state criminal
court was prohibited under the Fourteenth Amendment). In Haley, Justice Douglas
stated that "[n]either [adult] nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods
which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law." Haley, 332 U.S. at 601.
161. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
162. Id. at 33, 41, 55, 57.
163. Id. at 2-3.
164. Id. at 57 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966)).
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3. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Three years later, the Court, in In re Winship,165 further enhanced
juvenile procedural protections and held that juvenile adjudications,
like adult criminal convictions, required proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.166
Samuel Winship, age twelve, was charged with stealing money from a
woman's pocketbook in a furniture store. 167 A salesperson said she
saw Winship run from the store and then she discovered that the
money was missing.' 68 However, a defense witness testified that the
salesperson could not possibly have seen Winship because the salesper-
son was in another part of the store at the time of the theft.169
Under New York state law, the judge was required to find a "prepon-
derance of evidence" in order to adjudicate Winship.l 70 Despite the
witnesses' inconsistent testimonies, the judge found a "preponderance
of evidence" and ordered Winship to a training school for a period of
eighteen months to six years.'
71
The United States Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause requires the standard of proof in juvenile
proceedings to be "beyond a reasonable doubt."172 The Court stated,
"[t]he same considerations that demand extreme caution in fact find-
ing to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child."'73
The standard of proof is a constitutional safeguard and "is as much
required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding as
are those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault."174
4. No Right to a Jury Trial
One year after Winship, the Court retreated from further expansion
of due process rights to juvenile offenders. In McKeiver v. Penn-
165. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
166. Id. at 368.
167. BERNARD, supra note 36, at 120.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. "Preponderance" is a minimal standard of proof used in civil cases because
civil cases are premised upon the two parties being equal. Id. "Proof beyond a reason-
able doubt," on the other hand, is required in order to prove guilt in criminal court. Id.
If a defendant can prove that there is reasonable doubt, the defendant will be aquitted.
Id.
171. Id. at 120-21.
172. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-67 (1970).
173. Id. at 365 (emphasis added). The policy behind such a strict standard for crimi-
nal cases is that it "provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence. ..
Id. at 363.
174. Id. at 368.
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sylvania,175 the Court stated that a jury trial was not constitutionally
required in juvenile court proceedings.176
Joseph McKeiver, age sixteen, was charged with robbery, larceny,
and receiving stolen goods.177 Under Pennsylvania law, the charges
constituted felonies.178 Although jury trials are a constitutional right
in the criminal system, McKeiver's request for a jury trial was
denied.179
McKeiver argued that he should be granted a jury trial because his
juvenile trial proceedings mirrored adult criminal trials.180 For exam-
ple: McKeiver's petition used the language of an indictment; prior to
trial he was detained in a building similar to a prison; his counsel and
the prosecution engaged in plea bargaining; rules of evidence were
applied; the press and the public were admitted to the trial; and, once
adjudged delinquent, he could be confined until the age of majority in
a prison-like setting.tSt
The Court stated that although the right to ajury trial is a constitu-
tional safeguard in criminal trials, that right is not a constitutional re-
quirement in juvenile court.18 2 In support of its position, the McKeiver
Court outlined the differences between the two systems. First, the ad-
judication of delinquency in juvenile court is much less onerous than
the conviction of a crime in the criminal system.18 3 Second, juvenile
court judges handle cases differently than criminal court judges.18 4
But most significant, ajury trial is the one due process right that would
most disrupt and destroy the uniqueness of the juvenile court pro-
cess.1 85 The Court concluded that a juvenile offender can be given a
175. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
176. Id. at 545.
177. Id. at 534.
178. Id. The felony charges arose from an incident in which McKeiver and 20 or 30
other youths chased three younger teenagers and took 25 cents from them. Id. at 536.
179. Id. at 535. When McKeiver reached the Supreme Court, it was consolidated with
three other cases in which juveniles also argued for the right to a jury trial in juvenile
court. BERNARD, supra note 36, at 124. One of the cases was In re Terry, 265 A.2d 350
(Pa. 1970), in which Edward Terry was charged with assault and battery of a police
officer. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 535. The two other cases stemmed from racial discrimina-
tion protests. Id. at 536. In one case, Barbara Burrus and approximately 45 other black
children were charged with impeding traffic during a protest. In re Burrus, 167 S.E.2d
454 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969), aff'd, 169 S.E.2d 879 (N.C. 1969). In the other case, James
Lambert Howard was charged with willfully making riotous noise and defacing school
furniture. In re Shelton, 168 S.E.2d 695 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969), aff'd, 169 S.E.2d 879
(N.C. 1969).
180. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541.
181. Id. at 542.
182. Id. at 545.
183. Id. at 540.
184. Id. at 541.
185. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 540 (citing In re Terry, 265 A.2d 350, 354-55 (Pa. 1970)).
The Supreme Court applied a balancing test to determine whether or not due process
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fair trial without ajury.18 6 Therefore, the McKeiver Court decided that
jury trials were not fundamental to the juvenile court system.18 7
5. An Open Window: State Legislative Protection
Following McKeiver, the Supreme Court appears to have closed the
door on federal expansion of juvenile constitutional rights. However,
the Court left open a window for state expansion. Although the Court
declined to declare a constitutional right to ajury trial in juvenile pro-
ceedings, individual states may adopt legislation allowing jury trials for
juvenile offenders. 188 Today, nearly one-third of the states have de-
cided that a jury trial provides necessary protection in juvenile court
proceedings and have enacted such legislation.1 8 9
requires the right to ajury trial in juvenile court proceedings. Id. at 547; see also Lanes
v. State, 767 S.W.2d 789, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). The McKeiver Court balanced the
function of the jury as fact-finder against the impact on the proceedings and decided
that the presence of a jury did not strengthen the fact-finding function. McKeiver, 403
U.S. at 547. The Court also balanced the function of the right to a jury trial against its
impact on the juvenile system and decided that a jury would create an adversarial pro-
cess, thus destroying the system's unique nature. Id. at 545; see also State v. Turner, 453
P.2d 910, 913 (Or. 1969).
Factoring in the success or failure of the juvenile court system, the Court reluc-
tantly recognized that the system, nearly 100 years old, had not accomplished its reha-
bilitative goals. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547. However, the Court was unwilling to blame
the ineffectiveness of the system on its lack of procedural safeguards. Id. The Court,
instead, blamed the system's failure on a lack of proper funding and the lack of a public
commitment to learn and understand the reasons for the failure. Id.
186. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545; see also, Note, Joanna v. Billingsley, Juvenile Justice:
Procedural Safeguards for Delinquents at the Adjudicatory Stage - Not for Adults Only, 21 WASH-
BURN L.J. 288, 300 (1982).
187. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545. The Supreme Court relied partially on In re Terry,
265 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1970), which held that jury trials were not fundamental to the juve-
nile justice system because protecting children in juvenile proceedings was not as essen-
tial as protecting the accused's rights in criminal proceedings. Id. at 354-55. Justice
Blackmun, writing for the McKeiver majority, reasoned that while the Court had allowed
some constitutional safeguards to apply to juvenile offenders, "[tihe Court... has not
yet said that all rights constitutionally assured to an adult accused of crime also are to
be enforced or made available to the juvenile in [his or her] delinquency proceeding."
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 533 (emphasis added).
188. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547. The Supreme Court did not bar jury trials for juve-
nile offenders, but, instead, encouraged states to experiment with their juvenile court
systems to find the ideal process for juvenile proceedings. This process may include
jury trials. See Juvenile Juiy Trials, supra note 46, at 596.
189. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (1990 & Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-
501 (West 1990); IDAHO CODE § 16-1806A (1979 & Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 705,
para. 405/5-35 (Smith-Hurd 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1656 (1993); MASS. GEN. L.
ANN. ch. 119, § 55A (West 1993); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.17(2) (West 1993);
MoNrT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-521 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-16 (Michie 1978 & Supp.
1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1110 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-
1-7 (1981); TEX. CODE ANN. § 54.03(c) (West 1986 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-272 (Michie 1988); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-6 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.31 (2) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993); Wvo. STAT. § 14-6-223(c) (1986); see also 12JOHN
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Some states, such as Massachusetts, allow an unconditional right to a
jury trial in juvenile court proceedings because the right is of funda-
mental importance. 190 West Virginia also allows ajuvenile an uncondi-
tional right to a jury trial, recognizing that the presence of a jury
protects the juvenile offender against possible prejudice from a
judge. 191
Other states allow jury trials only in certain circumstances.192 For
example: Illinois allows a trial by jury for habitual juvenile offenders;193
Kansas provides jury trials if the offense, under adult prosecution, is
classified as a felony and if the trial is ordered by the judge;194 and
Montana grants jury trials only if the juvenile offender denies the al-
leged offenses. 195
C. The Right to a Jury Trial in Minnesota
Historically, jury trials have not been provided to juvenile offenders
in Minnesota1 96 despite recent efforts to provide strict procedural pro-
tections to juvenile offenders. In the recent case of In re D.S.S.,197 the
Minnesota Court of Appeals emphasized not only the right to counsel,
but also notice of the right to counsel for juvenile offenders.198
Although a social worker provided D.S.S. with written notice of his
right to counsel, the court stated that the notice was insufficient to
0. SONSTENG & ROBERT ScoTr, MINNESOTA PRACtiCE JUVENILE LAWS & PROCEDURE R.
27.01 commentary, at 409 (1985).
190. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 269 N.E.2d 277, 278 (Mass. 1971) (holding that the
function of a jury is to provide juvenile offenders with a fact-finding safeguard).
191. State ex rel. Smith v. Scott, 238 S.E.2d 223, 227 n.3 (W. Va. 1977). The Scott
court found that a judge who obtained potentially prejudicial information during a
transfer hearing was not precluded from holding a subsequent adjudicatory proceeding
because "the integrity of the fact-finding process is preserved by the right to have ajury
trial in a juvenile proceeding.. . ." Id. (referencing W.VA. CODE § 49-5-6 (1975)).
192. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19.1.105 (West 1990); IDAHO CODE § 16-1806A
(1979 & Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/5-35 (Smith-Hurd 1992); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-1656 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-521 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 32A-2-16 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-7 (1981); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-272 (Michie 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.237 (West 1987 & Supp. 1983).
193. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/5-35 (Smith-Hurd 1992). An habitual of-
fender is a minor who has been twice adjudicated a delinquent for offenses which
would have been felonies if the offender had been an adult. Id. The third adjudication
results in the status of a Habitual Juvenile Offender. In that case, the juvenile offender
is granted a jury trial unless the offender demands a bench trial. Id.
194. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1656 (1993); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-296 (Michie
1988).
195. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-521 (1981).
196. MINN. STAT. § 260.155, subd. 1 (Supp. 1993).
197. 506 N.W.2d 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
198. Id. at 653.
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meet the requirements of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile
Procedure. 19 9
The court expressed concern that a juvenile offender may not fully
understand the consequences of waiving the right to counsel. 200 Min-
nesota law, therefore, provides stronger protections than federal law in
requiring an advisement of the right to counsel in order to protect the
child from "manifest injustice."2 0 1
Despite the trend to provide heightened procedural protection in
the best interests of the juvenile offender, Minnesota has refused to
grant juveniles the right to a jury trial.202 Not only does a juvenile
offender not have the right to a jury trial in juvenile court, but under
Minnesota law, the juvenile offender cannot opt out ofjuvenile court
in favor of adult criminal proceedings in which ajury trial, as well as all
due process protections, are guaranteed.2 o3
One of the issues considered by the Advisory Task Force on the Juve-
nile Justice System was whether juvenile offenders should be granted
the right to ajury trial.204 A majority of the Task Force recommended
that the right to a jury trial only be granted to one group of juvenile
offenders, those juveniles that would be included in the newly created
Serious Youthful Offender category. 205 In a minority report, however,
the Task Force recommended that all juvenile offenders should be
granted the right to ajury trial.206 The Minnesota Legislature adopted
the recommendations of the majority.207 Subsequently, jury trials will
be provided for only a limited group of juvenile offenders in
Minnesota.
V. THE REAsONS FOR GRANTING OR DENYING JURY TRiALs
IN JUVENILE COURT
The issue of whether Minnesota should limit the right to jury trials
to a small group of serious juvenile offenders or should extend that
right to all juvenile offenders should be considered in the context of
the current law on the right to ajury trial injuvenile court. The follow-
ing survey analyzes the laws of the other forty-nine states, focusing on
199. Id. at 653-54; see MINN. R. Juv. P. 4.01, subd. 2 (1985) which requires that
juveniles receive an on-the-record explanation of the right to counsel. Id. Notice of the
right to counsel is required because "[t]hejuvenilejustice system is expected to rehabili-
tate the juvenile." D.S.S., 506 N.W.2d at 655.
200. Id. at 653.
201. Id. at 655; see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 41, 55, 57 (1967).
202. See State v. Little, 423 N.W.2d 722, 724 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
203. In re K.A.A., 410 N.W.2d 836, 839 (Minn. 1987).
204. MINN. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 645-49.
205. Id. at 648-49.
206. Id. at 649-52.
207. Act approved May 5, 1994, ch. 576, 1994 MINN. LAws 934.
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the reasons those states either grant or deny the right to a jury trial in
juvenile court.
A. Reasons States Grant this Right
Currently, ten states unconditionally grant juvenile offenders the
right to ajury trial.2 08 Although the reasons for extending this right to
juvenile court proceedings vary from state to state, courts consistently
act in the best interests of the child.
1. Protection from Prejudicial Judges
Because the juvenile court system is based on a relationship between
the juvenile offender and judge, the presiding judge must be a fair,
unbiased finder of fact.20 9 The future of the juvenile offender lies in
the judge's hands and, therefore, it is critical that prejudice not taint
the judge's decisions. Juvenile court judges may be biased or
prejudiced in a variety of ways.
First, the familiarity with a particular juvenile may prejudice a
judge.2 10 A judge who knows or is familiar with a juvenile offender,
because of the juvenile's past involvement with the court, is less likely
to be as fair as a jury of strangers. 2 1
1
Second, judges may be prejudiced when faced with cases similar to
those they have heard in the past.212 Because each child's circum-
stances are unique, judges who base decisions on precedent may
impede the juvenile system's goal of providing separate and individual-
ized attention to each child.
Third, judges may become prejudiced during the proceedings. For
example, Minnesota allows evidentiary hearings in juvenile court.2 13 A
judge often will combine the admissibility of evidence hearing and the
adjudication of delinquency hearing in one proceeding. 214 Conse-
quently, there is a risk that potentially damaging inadmissible evidence
208. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (1990 & Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119,
§ 55A (West 1993); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.17(2) (West 1993); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-5-521 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-16 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1993); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1110 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); TEX. CODE ANN. § 54.03(c) (West
1986 & Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-6 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.31(2)
(West 1987 & Supp. 1983); Wvo. STAT. § 14-6-223(c) (1986).
209. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (noting that a trial by jury is
a safeguard against a biased or eccentric judge).
210. See Juvenile Jury Trials, supra note 46, at 608.
211. Id.
212. Robert Gullick, Note, Right to Jury Trial: Indiana's Misapplication of Due Process
Standards in Delinquency Hearings, 45 IND. L.J. 578, 593 (1970).
213. MINN. STAT. § 260.155, subd. 1 (Supp. 1993).
214. Barry C. Feld, CriminalizingJuvenileJustice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court,
69 MINN. L. Rv. 141, 232 (1984) [hereinafter Criminalizing Juvenile Justice].
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will influence the judge.215 Despite the McKeiver Court's presumption
that judges can be fair, "given the same evidence, a judge in juvenile
court is more likely to convict a youth than would a jury of detached
citizens in a criminal proceeding."216
Providing the right to a jury trial protects against the dangers of bi-
ased or prejudicedjudges. 217 Even if ajudge were to preside over both
the admissibility hearing and adjudication hearing, the proceedings
would not be tainted with bias because "the integrity of the fact-finding
process [would be] preserved by the right to have ajury trial in ajuve-
nile proceeding."21
8
2. Assure Accurate Fact Finding
The function of ajury is to ascertain the truth in questions of fact.219
Juries are an essential part of the court system and are authorized to
evaluate the credibility of witnesses.220 Moreover, centuries of use
have proven the value of criminal jury trials.221 Juries "bring an ele-
ment of the community into the courtroom.... [P]ublic participation
[is] expected to temper the legal mind with a healthy dosage of com-
mon sense and human emotion."222 Juries also provide a nexus be-
tween the Legislature's original intentions and the community's sense
of justice. 223 This nexus is equally as important for juvenile offenders
as it is for adults.
3. Due Process and Fundamental Fairness Guarantee the Right to a
Jury Trial
In In re Gault,224 the Supreme Court stated that due process rights
are critically important because they define the rights of the individual
and provide protection from the state. 225 These protections include
the right to have the assistance of counsel,226 the right against self-
incrimination,227 the right to notice of charges,228 and the right to
215. Id. at 235.
216. MINN. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 650, 687.
217. State ex reL Smith v. Scott, 238 S.E.2d 223, 226 (W.Va. 1977). The Scott court
refused to prevent a juvenile court judge from presiding over both a transfer hearing
and any subsequent adjudicatory or criminal proceeding. Id. at 226-27.
218. Id. at 227 n.3; see also W. VA. CODE § 49-5-6 (1992).
219. 47 AM. JuR.2DJusy § 1 (1969).
220. In re Banschbach, 323 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Mont. 1958) (holding that denial of
jury trial for a minor was reversible error); see also Gullick, supra note 212, at 593, 609.
221. 47 AM. JUR.2D Jusy § 3 (1969).
222. Keegan, supra note 49, at 835-36.
223. MINN. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 686-87 (quoting CriminalizingJuve-
nile Justice, supra note 214, at 244-46).
224. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
225. Id. at 20.
226. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
227. Id. amend. V.
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confront witnesses.229 In Duncan v. Louisiana,2 30 decided one year af-
ter Gault, the Supreme Court held that the right to jury trial is a funda-
mental due process right in all criminal proceedings.
23 1
When Gault and Duncan are read together it is evident that because
due process rights are afforded to juvenile offenders in juvenile court
proceedings, 232 and jury trials are fundamental to due process, 2 33 a
due process right to a jury trial exists in juvenile court.2 3 4 Alaskan
courts follow this "combination" theory for allowing the right to jury
trials.23 5 Massachusetts also holds that the right to ajury trial is of such
fundamental importance that it should not be denied in juvenile court
proceedings. 2
36
4. Once Granted, a Right Cannot be Removed
Historically, children were granted the fundamental due process
right to ajury trial.237 Prior to the juvenile system's formation,juvenile
offenders were tried in the same type of proceedings as adults and the
right to ajury trial was granted to each person. 238 New Mexico is one
state that continues to grant juveniles that right.239 The New Mexico
Supreme Court stated that the formation of a separate juvenile system
should not remove a right previously granted to juvenile offenders.
240
The court reasoned, "[o]n what kind of theory could this [right] be de-
nied [to a child] merely by creating ajuvenile court and denominating
the proceedings as something different than criminal?"
2 41
228. Id. amend. VI.
229. Id.
230. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
231. Id. at 149.
232. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967).
233. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149.
234. See DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 38 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that the right to jury trial is so fundamental that there is no sufficient reason to
deprive juvenile offenders of this fight). Justice Douglas reached this conclusion by
balancing the rehabilitative ideal of the juvenile courts and the fundamental fairness of
the right to a jury trial. Id. at 38.
235. R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 31-33 (Alaska 1971).
236. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 269 N.E.2d 277, 278 (Mass. 1971).
237. Peyton v. Nord, 437 P.2d 716, 722 (N.M. 1968); see also supra notes 38-40 and
accompanying text.
238. Peyton, 437 P.2d at 722.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that "at the time of the adop-
tion of our constitution, petitioner could not have been imprisoned without a trial by
jury. This being true, no change in terminology or procedure may be invoked whereby
incarceration could be accomplished in a manner which involved denial of the right to
jury trial." Id. at 723.
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B. Reasons States Do Not Grant this Right
The majority of states do not grant juvenile offenders the right to a
jury trial.242 Clearly, these states intend to preserve the goals of the
original reformers of juvenile justice in providing a unique, informal
proceeding designed to rehabilitate rather than punish.
1. Juvenile Court Proceedings are Civil, Not Criminal
The juvenile court system originated from English chancery courts
which were civil in nature.2 4 3 Because the juvenile system was desig-
nated as "civil," some courts have stated that juvenile proceedings are
not entitled to the same due process and procedural rights available in
criminal proceedings. 24 4 Juvenile courts are "engaged in determining
the needs of the child . . . rather than adjudicating criminal con-
duct."245 An adjudication of delinquency in juvenile court does not
constitute a conviction of a crime even though the juvenile may have
committed a crime.246 The crime is simply evidence of whether or not
the child is delinquent.247 Juvenile courts were created to remove chil-
dren from criminal proceedings and to "get away from the notion that
the child is to be dealt with as a criminal."248
242. ALA. CODE § 12-15-65(a) (1986 & Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325
(Michie 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2316, 16-2327 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 39.052(1)(b) (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-28(a) (Michie 1990 & Supp.
1993); HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-41 (a) (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-7-10(c) (West 1980);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 610.070(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 3310(1) (West Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 3-812(f) (1989);
MINN. STAT. § 260.155, subd. 1 (1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-203(3) (1972); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 43-279(1) (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-62.193(1) (Michie 1993); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-40 (West 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-631 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-20-24(1) (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35(A) (Anderson 1990); OR. REV.
STAT. § 419.498(1) (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 6336(a) (1982 & Supp. 1993); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-755 (Law. Co-op 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-124(a) (1991); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-3a-33 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5523(a) (1991); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 13.04.021(2) (West 1993).
Currently, only 10 states unconditionally grant all juvenile offenders the right to a
jury trial. See supra note 208. See supra note 189 for a complete listing of states granting
the right to ajury trial. Although the United States Supreme Court has stated that the
fact that a practice is followed in many states is not conclusive evidence that it accords
due process, it is a factor to consider when determining whether a fundamental right is
at stake. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 548 (1971).
243. See BERNARD, supra note 36, at 88.
244. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966); see Carpenter, supra note 2, at
257.
245. Kent, 383 U.S. at 554.
246. State v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573, 581 (Me. 1979).
247. Elkins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983).
248. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAiv. L. REv. 104 (1909). Judge Mack
quoted from an early jury trial in juvenile court case:
To save a child from becoming a criminal . . . the legislature surely may
provide for the salvation of such a child . . . by bringing it into one of the
[Vol. 20
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss3/6
JURY TRIALS FOR JUVENILES
In some states, juvenile court legislation has been revised to mirror
the criminal justice system and, as a result, employs a punitive philoso-
phy.2 49 In 1977, the Washington Legislature altered the focus of its
Juvenile Court Act from treatment and rehabilitation to
punishment.250
The Washington Supreme Court considered whether a constitu-
tional right to ajury trial was required since juvenile proceedings were
now "akin" to adult criminal proceedings. 251 However, the court re-
fused to grant the right in juvenile court despite the newly-placed em-
phasis on punishment.2 52 The court stated that although the statute
placed an emphasis on accountability, "[a]ccountability . . . does as
much to rehabilitate, correct and direct errant youth as does the prior
philosophy of focusing upon the particular characteristics of the indi-
vidual juvenile."253 The court concluded that, in spite of the stated
purpose, the juvenile court proceedings were "not totally comparable
to an adult criminal offense scenario."2
54
courts of the state without any process at all, for the purpose of subjecting it to
the state's guardianship and protection.
The action is not for the trial of a child charged with a crime, but is merci-
fully to save it from such an ordeal, with the prison or penitentiary in its
wake .... Whether the child deserves to be saved by the state is no more a
question for a jury than whether the father, if able to save it, ought to save it.
Id. at 110 (quoting Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198 (Pa. 1905)).
249. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(b) (West Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 15, § 3002.1(C) (West 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2)(a), (c), (d)
(West 1993).
250. State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772 (Wash. 1979). The reform included an emphasis
on accountability as well as sentencing guidelines based on the age, crime, and criminal
history of the offenders. Id. at 772-73.
251. Id. at 772.
252. Id. at 774.
253. Id. at 773. The court also noted that the Legislature had not merely mandated
punishment in the statute, but intended to provide treatment and supervision for juve-
nile offenders. Id. (interpreting WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2) (f) (West 1977).
Moreover, the court relied on the Supreme Court's refusal to guarantee the right to a
jury trial in juvenile court proceedings. Id. (relying on McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971)).
254. Id. at 774. The Washington Supreme Court, in 1987, again defended its denial
ofjury trials notwithstanding the imposition of monetary penalties for juvenile offend-
ers and the possibility of adult incarceration. State v. Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240, 244 (Wash.
1987). The Schaaf court refused to grant jury trials because the legislature had not
completely rejected the goal of rehabilitation. Id. at 244. Although juvenile proceed-
ings had been modified, some degree of flexibility and informality still existed in the
proceedings. Id. at 245.
The court also cited examples demonstrating that juvenile proceedings are not
adversarial: juvenile offenders are not automatically fingerprinted and photographed;
juvenile offenders may sign diversion agreements instead of being prosecuted; mitigat-
ing factors are considered at hearings; and limitations are placed on the use of the
juvenile offender's record. Id. at 245-46.
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2. Uniqueness of the Juvenile Courts
Courts often deny juvenile offenders the right to a jury trial on the
premise that a jury would destroy the unique nature of juvenile court
proceedings.2 55 Juvenile courts are unique because of the philosophy
under which the courts were created. The reformers' parens patriae
concept is based on establishing a close relationship between the judge
and child.256 The juvenile court judge should oversee each stage of
the proceeding and "be in command, ever ready to guide counsel, par-
ent and child."257 In order achieve this goal, the judge should have
maximum flexibility, free from the formalities and procedural com-
plexities of criminal proceedings. 258
The judge needs flexibility to "impart a feeling of security and be-
longing, communicate the importance and dignity of being a member
of society and.., prevent the child from pursuing a criminal and anti-
social career .... [Thejudge] must have patience, understanding, and
a genuine interest in the welfare of the child .... "259 Under this the-
ory, the rehabilitative process will begin and succeed only if there is a
close relationship between the judge and the child.260
Introducing ajury into the proceedings would destroy the relation-
ship between the "fatherly" judge and the "erring youth"2 61 and, as a
result, the judge would have difficulty fulfilling the Legislature's in-
tended goals.2 62 The judge's position would be drastically altered to
that of a judge in a criminal trial.263
The court further reasoned that if the Legislature intended to grant all procedural
rights and equate the proceedings with criminal courts, it would have abandoned the
juvenile court system altogether. Id. at 250. Instead, the Legislature chose to restruc-
ture the system to "better serve the needs of the community and the juvenile while
retaining the features of informality and individualized attention." Id.
255. In re Fucini, 255 N.E.2d 380, 383 (Il1. 1970).
256. State v. Gullings, 416 P.2d 311, 312 (Or. 1966).
257. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 234 A.2d 9, 16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967).
258. Bible v. State, 254 N.E.2d 319, 323 (Ind. 1970).
259. Johnson, 234 A.2d at 17.
260. State v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573, 584 (Me. 1979); see also State v. Turner, 453 P.2d
910, 914 (Or. 1969) (suggesting that the adjudicative phase of the juvenile court pro-
cess provides a unique opportunity in the case of first-time offenders and might prevent
them from becoming repeat offenders). The Turner court feared that the introduction
of ajury into this delicate proceeding may have an adverse effect on first-time offenders
and cause them to further rebel against the justice system. Id.
261. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1967). In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme
Court rejected the constitutional guarantee of jury trials in juvenile court proceedings
because a jury would terminate the "idealistic prospect of intimate, informal, protective
proceeding[s]." 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
262. Johnson, 234 A.2d at 17.
263. Bible v. State, 254 N.E.2d 319, 327 (Ind. 1970); In re R.Y., 189 N.W.2d 644, 653
(N.D. 1971).
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Juvenile courts are also unique because the system was specially cre-
ated for children with the intent to remove them from adult criminal
courts to a more informal, individualized setting.264 By design, juve-
nile courts lack the adversarial aspects of criminal courts in order to
create an atmosphere more conducive to treatment. 265
The Washington Supreme Court upheld state legislation that denied
juvenile offenders the right to a jury trial on the basis that juvenile
proceedings are private, informal hearings. 266 Similarly, the Oregon
Supreme Court refused to grant juvenile offenders certain procedural
rights granted to adults in criminal court because the "informal ...
atmosphere [of the juvenile court] ... is the antithesis of adult criminal
procedure."267 North Dakota refused to allow jury trials, reasoning
that a jury would formalize procedures and thus destroy the very pur-
pose of the juvenile court system.2 68
3. Juvenile Court Proceedings Would Become Adversarial
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,2 69 the United States Supreme Court
stated that the presence of a jury would place the juvenile offender
"squarely in the routine of the criminal process." 270 Accordingly, some
states deny juveniles the right to a jury trial reasoning that juvenile
proceedings will become adversarial and create the appearance of a
criminal trial.271 The Kentucky Court of Appeals, also concerned with
appearances, stated:
Ajury trial, with all the clash and clamor of the adversary system that
necessarily goes with it, would certainly invest a juvenile proceeding
the appearance of a criminal trial and create in the mind and mem-
ory of the child the same effect as if it were [a criminal trial].272
4. Juvenile Courts Are Separate and Unequal
The McKeiver Court stated that one of the reasons for denying the
right to ajury trial in juvenile proceedings is thatjuvenile and criminal
proceedings cannot be equated. 273 The Court also suggested that if a
procedural formality such as ajury trial were introduced into the juve-
264. KETCHAM, supra note 50, at 14.
265. Id.
266. Estes v. Superior Court, 438 P.2d 205, 208 (Wash. 1968) (referencing the stat-
ute currently codified at WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.04.021(2) (West 1993)); see also
Robinson v. State, 179 S.E.2d 248, 249 (Ga. 1971).
267. State v. Gullings, 416 P.2d 311, 312 (Or. 1966).
268. In re R.Y., 189 N.W.2d 644, 653 (N.D. 1971).
269. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
270. Id. at 547.
271. Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457, 461 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); see also
Findlay v. State, 681 P.2d 20, 21 (Kan. 1984).
272. Dryden, 435 S.W.2d at 461.
273. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550.
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nile court system, "there [would be] little need for [thejuvenile court's]
separate existence."2 74 Despite similarities between juvenile proceed-
ings and criminal trials-both involve persons accused of criminal con-
duct and an adjudication in either could lead to incarceration-courts
refuse to equate juvenile proceedings with a criminal trial.275 This re-
fusal serves as further justification for denying juvenile offenders the
right to a jury trial.276
5. Delay, Delay, Delay
Juvenile courts theoretically enjoy simple and expedited administra-
tion.277 A jury trial in juvenile court could burden the proceedings
and result in delay.278 Adding a jury trial to juvenile proceedings
would require additional time, personnel, paperwork, and expense.2 79
The Alabama Supreme Court refused to allow jury trials because of its
concern with detrimental effects on the orderly functions of juvenile
proceedings.2 8 0 The court feared that the administrative efficiency of
juvenile court proceedings would be hindered.281 North Dakota and
Pennsylvania courts share similar concerns that such delays could com-
plicate the rehabilitative process.28 2
The majority of states continue to deny the right to a jury trial in
juvenile court proceedings because of historical reasons that
originated with the nineteenth-century reformers. The ultimate justifi-
cation for denying juvenile offenders the right to ajury trial is the ne-
cessity of acting in the best interests of the child.
VI. MINNESOTA SHOULD GRANT THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN
JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS
The nature of the acts committed by juvenile offenders and the pro-
ceedings in juvenile court have changed dramatically since the juvenile
justice system's inception. As a result, the juvenile court system now
274. Id. at 551; see also Findlay, 681 P.2d at 22 (citing McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 551;Juve-
nile Court Legislative Reform, supra note 107, at 242. Professor Feld offers a similar sugges-
tion stating that juvenile offenders should not be tried in juvenile courts but in adult
courts with full procedural protections. After conviction, juvenile offenders could re-
ceive appropriate dispositions based on such factors as criminal history, age, and availa-
bility of facilities. Id.
275. Dyden, 435 S.W.2d at 461.
276. Id.
277. People ex rel. T.M., 742 P.2d 905, 907 (Colo. 1987).
278. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550.
279. In re D., 261 N.E.2d 627, 630 (N.Y. 1970); see also Gullick, supra note 218, at 591.
280. Raines v. State, 317 So.2d 559, 564 (Ala. 1975).
281. Id.
282. In re R.Y., 189 N.W.2d 644, 653 (N.D. 1971); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 234
A.2d 9, 17 (Penn. 1967); see also Foley, supra note 37, at 995; Gullick, supra note 212, at
590.
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mirrors the adult criminal court system. Because of these ever-increas-
ing similarities, the due process protection afforded by a jury trial is
critical.283 A careful analysis of the reasons for and against jury trials
shows that Minnesota should grant the right to a jury trial to all juve-
nile offenders.
A. Juvenile Court Proceedings are Criminal, Not Civil
1. The Proceedings Sound Criminal
The justification for refusing to allowjury trials in juvenile court pro-
ceedings is often based on the underlying philosophical difference be-
tween adult courts and juvenile courts. The underlying purpose of the
criminal justice system is punitive, whereas the juvenile justice system is
intended to be helpful and rehabilitative. 284 In the criminal justice
system, punishment "involves the imposition by the State, for purposes
of retribution or deterrence, of burdens on an individual who has vio-
lated legal prohibitions." 285 In contrast, the juvenile justice system "fo-
cuses on the .. . future welfare of the individual. ... 286
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,287 the Supreme Court reasoned that, be-
cause the juvenile court system provided only positive rehabilitative
treatment, special safeguards to protect individual rights were unneces-
283. The provision ofjury trials in the juvenile court system gives rise to an interest-
ing question: because the case must be tried before a jury of the defendant's peers,
must the jury include persons at least as young as the juvenile offender? R.L.R. v. State,
487 P.2d 27, 33 (Alaska 1971). Ajury of peers preserves the defendant's enjoyment of
full protection of the laws. A jury is to be "composed of the peers or equals of the
accused so as to afford [the accused] a tribunal free of the prejudices that often exist
against certain classes in the community." Stacey L. Kepnes, United States v. DeGross:
The Ninth Circuit Expands Restrictions on a Criminal Defendant's Right to Exercise Peremptory
Challenges, 23 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 109, 121 n.85 (1992).
Although a jury comprised of persons the same age as the juvenile offender may
not comprehend the seriousness of the offender's actions, a jury composed of adults
may be prejudiced against juvenile offenders. Consequently, ajury consisting of either
peers or adults may not prove a suitable jury for the juvenile offender. If young per-
sons, or persons the same age as the juvenile offender, are excluded from the jury, then
the defendant could face equal protection and due process problems, similar to the
problems faced by racial minorities. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82
(1976). In most states, however, persons over 18 may serve asjurors. Juvenile Jury Trials,
supra note 46, at 612 (citing MINN. STAT. § 593.41, subd. 2(2) (1982)). The age of 18
may be sufficient to be considered a "peer." Moreover, "peer" has never been so nar-
rowly defined as to include only persons the age of the accused. Id. at 612.
284. State v. Turner, 453 P.2d 910, 913 (Or. 1969); see also 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992); United States v. Hill, 538 F.2d 1072, 1074 (4th Cir. 1976).
285. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treat-
ment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REv. 821, 833 (1988) [hereinafter The Juvenile
Court].
286. Id.
287. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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sary.2 88 Recently, however, state legislation has moved away from the
rehabilitative ideals of juvenile justice reform toward "an emphasis on
public safety, the seriousness of a youth's offense, and social con-
trol."289 Many states have reworded preambles, purpose clauses, and
the sentencing guidelines ofjuvenile court acts to express accountabil-
ity and punishment instead of rehabilitation and treatment.2 9 0 The
movement from rehabilitation to punishment "call [s] into question the
underlying rationales of McKeiver that juvenile dispositions are benign
and therapeutic .... "291
In 1977, for example, the Washington Legislature revised itsJuvenile
Court Act to emphasize the juvenile offender's prior criminal activity
for the purpose of sentencing.2 92 Washington's 'just deserts,"293 sen-
tencing guidelines mandate that the punishment of an adjudicated de-
linquent shall be a reflection of the juvenile offender's age, offense
and juvenile history.2
9 4
In 1980, the Minnesota Legislature changed the language of the
Purpose Clause to the Juvenile Court Act from "care and guidance"
295
288. Id. at 552 (White, J., concurring). In McKeiver, Justice White supported the
denial ofjury trials for juvenile offenders and distinguished between the consequences
of unlawful adult behavior and the consequences of unlawful juvenile behavior. He
found a "substantial gulf" between adult criminal guilt resulting in incarceration for
punishment and juvenile delinquency resulting in commitment for rehabilitation. Id.
at 553. See juvenilejuy Trials, supra note 46, at 597 (quoting McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 553).
"Justice White] feared that jury trials would leave states free to 'embrace condemnation,
punishment and deterrence as permissible and desirable attributes of the juvenile justice
system.' " Id. (quoting McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 551). Many states, however, including Min-
nesota, combine punishment and deterrence in the treatment of juvenile offenders.
Therefore, according to Justice White's reasoning, jury trials should be implemented in
today's juvenile courts. Id. at 597 n.69.
289. MINN. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 685.
290. Id.; see The Juvenile Cout, supra note 285, at 842.
291. MINN. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 686.
292. State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772, 772-73 (Wash. 1979).
293. The "just deserts" concept is based on individual and systematic accountability
rather than rehabilitation. Offenders often fall into different categories that have pre-
determined sentences and standard ranges. The Juvenile Court, supra note 285, at 852-
53. For example, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.40.020(1), (13), (14) (West 1993), places
offenders in three categories: serious, middle, or minor. Each category has its own
predetermined sentence.
294. Lawley, 591 P.2d at 773. The Washington statute provides:
It is the intent of the legislature that ... youth, in turn, be held accountable
for their offenses.... To effectuate these policies, the legislature declares the
following to be equally important for purposes of this chapter:... Protect the
citizenry from criminal behavior; ... Make the juvenile offender accountable
for his or her criminal behavior; .. . Provide for punishment commensurate
with the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender....
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2) (a), (c), (d) (West 1993). Despite this change in
policy toward juvenile offenders, Washington continues to deny the right to jury trials
in juvenile court proceedings. Lawey, 591 P.2d at 774.
295. Act approved April 24, 1959, ch. 685 § 1, 1959 MINN. LAws 1275, 1275.
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to "promot[ing] the public safety."2 9 6 The state legislatures of Califor-
nia and Maine also have changed statutory language and permit juve-
nile offenders to be punished.297
Some commentators suggest that the changes from rehabilitative
purposes to punitive purposes move the juvenile court system closer to
the criminal court system.298 In fact, the Purpose Statement of Minne-
sota's Juvenile Court Act is similar to the Purpose Statement of the
Minnesota Criminal Code.299
The Purpose Statement of the Minnesota Juvenile Court Act reads as
follows: " [T]o promote the public safety and reduce juvenile delin-
quency by maintaining the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting
certain behavior and by developing individual responsibility for lawful
behavior."300 In comparison, the Purpose Statement of the Minnesota
Criminal Code reads as follows: "To protect the public safety and wel-
fare by preventing the commission of crime through the deterring
effect of the sentences authorized, the rehabilitation of those con-
victed, and their confinement when the public safety and interest
requires . 30. "301
The increasing similarities between juvenile and criminal courts
erode prior justifications for denying the right to ajury trial in juvenile
court that were based on the systems' different purposes. Because
juveniles face an increasing possibility that they will be punished for
their actions, jury trials must be required as a safeguard to protect their
rights.
296. Act approved April 15, 1980, ch. 580 § 3, 1980 MINN. LAws 962, 966; see also
MINN. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 685.
297. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(d) (West Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit.
15, § 3002.1(c) (West 1980).
298. Forst & Blomquist, supra note 33, at 2 (1992); Juvenile Court Legislative Reform,
supra note 104, at 200.
The movement toward the criminal court system may not be merely theoretical.
There is increasing evidence that juvenile court dispositions, although intended to be
rehabilitative, often are punitive. Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 214, at 259.
Professor Feld suggests that the daily reality of juvenile facilities is characterized by
predatory behavior and custodial incarceration. Id. at 259-61.
In McKeiver, Justice Douglas stated that juvenile facilities are often no better than
criminal facilities. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 560 (1971) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting). Justice Douglas described a Pennsylvania facility that had barred windows,
locked steel doors, a cyclone fence topped with barbed wire, and guard towers. Id. If
juvenile courts are punishing instead of rehabilitating, then it appears that the underly-
ing rationale for distinguishing between juvenile and adult court has been eliminated.
The Juvenile Court, supra note 285, at 837-38.
299. Juvenile Court Legislative Reform, supra note 104, at 198.
300. MINN. STAT. § 260.011, subd. 2(c) (1992).
301. Id. § 609.01, subd. 1 (1992).
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2. The Proceedings Look Criminal
Since In re Gault,30 2 the proceedings in juvenile courts have taken on
a more criminal appearance.0s For example, in Minnesota, the laws
of evidence apply to juvenile court proceedings;304 juvenile courts can
levy fines up to $700 against the juvenile offender;305 "probable cause"
that the child offender committed the offense is a prerequisite to hold-
ing a reference hearing;3 06 the prosecutor must show by "clear and
convincing" evidence that the child is not suitable for treatment or that
public safety is not served under juvenile court laws;3 0 7 and parental
presence is not required in order for children to properly waive their
rights.3 08
It is likely that adherence to these rules will consume more time.30 9
The "reforms will probably create more formal and adversarial juvenile
court proceedings .... Viewed as a whole, the revisions eliminate al-
most all remaining distinctions between juvenile and adult criminal
proceedings. Except for the absence of jury trials, juvenile court
proceedings now encompass all the trappings of a criminal
prosecution."310
The introduction of criminal policies and procedures into Minne-
sota's juvenile court proceedings has caused the juvenile court system
to take on a criminal appearance.3 1 1 With these changes, the juvenile
302. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
303. See Billingsley, supra note 186, at 314. Billingsley states that society has realized
the ineffectiveness of the juvenile court and has introduced a more legalistic approach
to the present juvenile court system. "Undoubtedly, juvenile delinquents will benefit
from that aspect of the legalistic approach which advocates procedural fairness." Id.
304. MINN. STAT. § 260.155 (1992);Juvenile Court Legislative Reform, supra note 104, at
196.
305. MINN STAT. § 260.185(1)(f) (1992);Juvenile Court Legislative Reform, supra note
104, at 196. In 1981, Professor Feld noted that the courts had power to levy fines up to
$500.00. Juvenile Court Legislature Reform, supra note 104, at 196. The amount has since
been increased to $700.00. MINN. STAT. § 260.185(1)(f) (1992).
306. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2)(d)(1) (1992); Juvenile Court Legislative Reform, supra
note 104, at 204.
307. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2)(d)(2) (1992); Juvenile Court Legislative Reform, supra
note 104, at 206.
308. MINN. R. Juv. P. 15.02 (1994); Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 214, at
190.
309. Juvenile Court Legislative Reform, supra note 104, at 223.
310. Id. at 241. Professor Feld suggests that providing jury trials in juvenile court
proceedings will result in one of three scenarios. Barry C. Feld, Juvenile (In)Justice and
the Criminal Court Alternative, 39 CIUME & DEUNQUENCy 403, 413 (1993). First, the juve-
nile court could be restructured to accommodate the rehabilitative purpose. Id. Sec-
ond, juvenile court proceedings could acknowledge punishment as a goal and add
more criminal procedural safeguards. Id. Third, juvenile courts could be abolished
and children could be tried with adults. Id.
311. One of the recommendations of the Advisory Task Force on the juvenile justice
System is that the Legislature create a new category for serious offenders and repeat
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system has become closely alligned with the criminal system and, like
that system, must also guarantee the right to a jury trial.
B. Jury Trials are a Due Process Right
The right to due process in all court proceedings is essential to every
individual. In Gault, the Court found that certain judicial procedures
were fundamental to due process and they were granted to offenders
in juvenile court proceedings.312
Gault underscored the importance of procedural rights. After years
of juvenile courts acting with 'judicial discretion," the Court recog-
nized that "unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is
frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure." 31 3
Since Gault, states have afforded broader procedural protections to
offenders in juvenile court proceedings that safeguard due process
rights. 3 1 4 These constitutional rights include the right to ajury trial,3t5
probable cause,3 16 double jeopardy,3 17 the right to effective counsel,3 18
offenders called the "Serious Youthful Offender" category. MINN. TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 6, at 633-41. The criteria for this category are carefully explained in the
report. Id. The Task Force further recommended that Serious Youthful Offenders be
provided the right to a jury trial. Id. at 64849.
The Minnesota Legislature recently enacted the recommendations of the Task
Force. Act approved May 5, 1994, ch. 576, § 19, 1994 MINN. LAWS 951. Instead of the
term "serious youthful offender," the act employs the term "extended jurisdiction juve-
nile" to describe serious juvenile offenders. Id. With this minor change in terminology,
the legislature granted the right to ajury trial only to those juveniles that fall within the
extended jurisdiction juvenile category.
The Minority Report recommended thatjury trials be afforded in all juvenile court
proceedings. MINN. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 691. The recommendation
was based on the fact that, in reality, juvenile courts are "little more than a scaled-down
criminal court for young people." Id. at 685. The Minority Report's position is that a
change in semantics from "criminal" to "juvenile delinquent" cannot alter the reality
that the loss of a child's liberty, involuntary separation from family, or supervision by a
probation officer is retributive. Id. at 689. Juvenile offenders charged with offenses
that result in "coercive state intervention" should receive the same procedural safe-
guards as criminals, including the right to jury trials. Id.
Because the Minnesota Legislature has followed the recommendations of the Task
Force, juvenile courts will resemble criminal courts more closely than ever. The right to
a jury trial, however, which is only afforded to criminals in adult court, will not be
afforded to the vast majority ofjuvenile offenders in juvenile court proceedings.
312. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1967).
313. Id. at 18.
314. Gault protected the following juvenile due process constitutional rights: ade-
quate written notice to the juvenile and the juvenile's parents of the specific issues,
representation by counsel, constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and con-
frontation of witnesses. Id. at 33, 41, 55, 57.
315. See statutes cited supra note 189.
316. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized the importance of due pro-
cess protections within its juvenile courts when, as a result of overcrowded dockets and
facilities, the system became conducive to abuse and discrimination. Lanes v. State, 767
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the right to appeal an adjudication,319 the right not to be tried while
incompetent,3 20 and the right to a public trial.321
There is no substantial difference between constitutional or state
rights presently guaranteed in juvenile court proceedings and the right
to a jury trial.
Surely if the gravity of what may happen to a defendant in ajuvenile
proceeding is sufficient to invoke the other constitutional protec-
tions we have mentioned [in Gault], by force of the same reasoning it
would seem also to call for the right to ajury trial, which could hardly
be classified as a less vital instrument of protection than the
others.3
22
S.W.2d 789, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). To determine whether the procedural right
of requiring probable cause should be granted in juvenile court proceedings, the court
compared the purpose and goals of the juvenile court system with the protection that
probable cause provides an individual. Id. at 794. The court stated that the purpose of
juvenile court is "to provide for the care, the protection, and the wholesome moral,
mental, and physical development of children .... " Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.01 (1) (West 1986). The requirement of probable cause protects against the preju-
dicial use of police power. Id. at 795.
The court recognized the shortcomings of the juvenile system and noted that "even
at the expense of procedural protections, the exalted ideals of rehabilitation in the
juvenile system have failed." Id. at 798. The court reasoned that children have a strong
sense of justice, which can easily be turned to cynicism. "Even a juvenile who has vio-
lated the law but is unfairly arrested will feel deceived and thus resist any rehabilitative
efforts." Id. at 795.
Not yet ready to abandon the rehabilitative ideal, the court attempted to combine
a system of treatment and procedure and held that probable cause was required in
juvenile court proceedings. Id. at 800. "Thus, while we dispel the antiquated and un-
realistic resistance to procedural safeguards, we continue to embrace a rehabilitative
and treatment oriented spirit." Id.
317. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (holding that the prosecution of a
juvenile in superior court, after an adjudicatory proceeding in juvenile court, violated
the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment); see also In reJ.R.R., 696 S.W.2d
382, 384 (Tex. 1985) (determining that, because juvenile offenders are entitled to due
process, they are entitled to double jeopardy protection).
318. Gilliam v. State, 808 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Ark. 1991) (stating that certain due pro-
cess safeguards, including the right to counsel, that are normally administered in crimi-
nal proceedings have been extended to juvenile court proceedings).
319. In re Brown, 439 F.2d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 1971) (declaring that the informality of
the juvenile court proceedings makes the right to appeal vital in order to protect those
subjected to the system).
320. In reW.A.F., 573 A.2d 1264, 1266 (D.C. 1990) (holding that because adults are
denied due process if forced to stand trial while incompetent, juveniles have the same
constitutional right).
321. In re Dino, 359 So.2d 586, 597 (La. 1978) (deciding that the right to a public
trial, like the right to jury trial, is fundamental to the American scheme of justice).
322. Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457, 460-61 (Ky. 1968). The Dryden
court did not extend the right to jury trials to juvenile offenders because the Supreme
Court had not yet ruled on the issue. Id. at 461. The Kentucky court appeared unwill-
ing to anticipate tha t the Supreme Court would interpret Gault broadly to encompass
the right to a jury trial. Id.
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just as the procedural protections in Gault were justified, so too is
the right to ajury trial in juvenile court. The current trend evidences
the increase in procedural protections in juvenile courts. Jury trials
are a necessary part of those protections.
C. There is Little Delay, Delay, Delay
Although courts express concern with the administrative impact of
implementing jury trials, in reality, administrative concerns do not
pose a threat to the proceedings. The Minnesota Supreme Court Advi-
sory Task Force on the Juvenile Justice System specifically addressed
this problem and surveyed those states that currently provide jury tri-
als. 32 3 The surveys indicate that, in practice, juvenile offenders seldom
exercise their right to a jury trial. In three of the states that allow a
juvenile offender the right to a jury trial, "only one percent or less of
the total juvenile delinquency dispositions were by jury trial" in
1992.324 Arguably, the potential for an administrative burden exists.
However, if the frequency of jury trials in juvenile court proceedings
remains as low in other states, there will be little burden.325
The Minnesota Task Force concluded that because the states that
allow jury trials in juvenile court proceedings experienced little admin-
istrative impact, "there would be minimal impact to the juvenile justice
system in Minnesota."3 26 Even if the right to ajury trial is seldom in-
voked when implemented within the juvenile court system, the Minor-
ity Report states that "the theoretical availability of a jury provides an
important practical safeguard for the overall quality ofjustice."327
VII. CONCLUSION
The juvenile court system has undergone many changes since its re-
habilitative goals were first implemented. Primarily in response to the
increase in juvenile crime, some procedural protections that were pre-
viously granted only in criminal courts have been granted to offenders
in juvenile courts. However, the right to jury trials is not among these
protections. Although some states grant the right to ajury trial injuve-
nile court proceedings in the best interests of the child, other states
ironically deny the right for the same reason. Some states argue that
added safeguards are the best way to provide protection; others claim
323. MINN. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 647 n.123 (receiving survey responses from
Alaska, Massachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, West Virginia, Wiscon-
sin, and Wyoming).
324. Id. at 647 n.12 4 (referring to Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico).
325. Id. at 647 n.126; see Peyton v. Nord, 437 P.2d 716, 726 (N.M. 1968) (stating that,
in most cases, jury trials will be waived and it will be the exceptional case that demands
a jury).
326. MINN. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 647.
327. Id. at 651, 688.
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fewer procedural protections are necessary. Because juvenile courts
have shifted their focus so radically from rehabilitation toward retribu-
tion, due process protection is critical. Little justification remains for
denying juvenile offenders the due process protection of jury trials
when juvenile courts mirror criminal proceedings.
Rehabilitation need not be abandoned. Instead, rehabilitation
should be incorporated with due process protections. This type of ju-
venile court system will provide juvenile offenders with treatment and
protection-the best of both worlds.3 28
Equal and exact justice to all . . . and trial by juries impartially se-
lected. These principles form the bright constellation which has
gone before us, and guides our steps.... Should we wander from
them in moments of error.., let us hasten to retrace our steps and
to regain the road .... 329
KoRINE L. LARSEN
328. Lanes v. State, 767 S.W.2d 789, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
329. In reJavier, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 430 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Thomas Jef-
ferson, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801).
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